Incidents/2024-09-23 pc1013 hardware issue
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document status: draft
Summary
Incident ID | 2024-09-23 replication | Start | 2024-09-23 14:47:03 |
---|---|---|---|
Task | T375382 | End | 2024-09-23 15:23:23 |
People paged | 1 | Responder count | 4 |
Coordinators | jynus | Affected metrics/SLOs | No relevant SLOs exist |
Impact | reading any wiki was way slower than before |
A memory error triggered an error which killed MariaDB
Timeline
All conversation logs are visible under this archive: https://wm-bot.wmcloud.org/logs/%23wikimedia-operations/20240923.txt
- 14:47:03: Initial alert from
<icinga-wm>
indicating that hostpc1013
is down with 100% packet loss. - 14:47:21: Incident
5267
acknowledged by<sukhe>
. - 14:48:39:
<moritzm>
reports a DIMM error in SEL. - 14:50:26:
<moritzm>
attempts to power cyclepc1013
. - 14:54:13:
pc1013
recovers, but concerns about stability remain. - 14:57:44:
pc1013
crashes again. - 14:58:26: Decision to failover to
pc1015
is made. - 14:59:14:
<jynus>
restartspc1015
to apply Puppet changes. - 15:02:11: Failover to
pc1015
is committed. - 15:03:09: Users start reconnecting to the new master.
- 15:07:38: Recovery of MariaDB Replica Lag and IO on
pc2013
. - 15:09:12: Circular replication setup completed.
- 15:24:31:
<jynus>
disables monitoring forpc1013
. - 15:29:48: Acknowledgment that performance will be degraded for a few hours.
Detection
- Root Cause: DIMM error in
pc1013
causing repeated crashes. Caught by monitoring - Resolution: Failover to
pc1015
and setup of circular replication. - Impact: Degraded performance due to empty cache and increased parser activity.
Conclusions
This is a minor incident which could have been way bigger if jynus
was not around because we lack automation to handle that sort of fix which requires SQL coordination as parser cache instances are multi-source (see: Parser cache and Orchestrator). Fixing this issue required to move a spare server to the impacted section, which is still a non trivial operation as there is little documentation and automation around it.
Links to relevant documentation
- There is no links to this specific issue as it was a complete surprise to everyone involved
- There is, however, generic advice at: https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/MariaDB/troubleshooting#Data_inconsistency_between_nodes_%22drift%22_/_replication_broken
Actionables
Scorecard
Question | Answer
(yes/no) |
Notes | |
---|---|---|---|
People | Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents? | yes | |
Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively | yes (?) | ||
Were fewer than five people paged? | yes | ||
Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)? | yes (?) | ||
Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers? Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours. | n/a | ||
Process | Was the "Incident status" section atop the Google Doc kept up-to-date during the incident? | no | A doc was not setup |
Was a public wikimediastatus.net entry created? | no | A docstatus was not created | |
Is there a phabricator task for the incident? | yes | ||
Are the documented action items assigned? | yes | ||
Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence? | yes (?) | we have identified what to fix so this is actionable in several ways | |
Tooling | To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are
open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented. |
yes | |
Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling? | yes | ||
Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders? | yes | ||
Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service? | n/a | ||
Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook? | no | ||
Total score (count of all “yes” answers above) | 9 |