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Incidents/2023-02-23 PHP worker threads exhaustion

From Wikitech

document status: in-review

Summary

Incident metadata (see Incident Scorecard)
Incident ID 2023-02-23 PHP worker threads exhaustion Start 17:17
Task T330422 End 17:42
People paged 6 (VictorOps incident 1, VictorOps incident 2) Responder count 4
Coordinators Brett Cornwall Affected metrics/SLOs
Impact Minimal user-facing errors served

db1127 was too busy to respond even to the simple statistics queries that the mysql prometheus exporter runs. The MariaDB query killer has a bug in 10.6.10 where queries were not properly killed. This was fixed in 10.6.12. db1127 was one of the remaining hosts to still be on 10.6.10.

Timeline

SAL log

All times in UTC.

  • 17:17 - Splunk on-call page
  • 17:17 - brett acknowledges
  • 17:23 - Page automatically resolved by SYSTEM
  • 17:24 - Second page fires
  • 17:24 - brett acknowledges
  • 17:25 - DBs identified as culprit (<hnowlan> seems all s7)
  • 17:26 - <cdanis> […] we're not [serving many errors] *yet*, but we need to figure out what's causing this and get it to stop
  • 17:27 - Brett becomes IC
  • 17:29 - <cdanis> […] looks like db1127 is a bit out to lunch
  • 17:31 - cdanis lowers db1127 weight from 400 to 200 via https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Dbctl#Changing_weights_for_a_host (<+logmsgbot> !log cdanis@cumin1001 dbctl commit (dc=all): 'db1127 running very hot', diff saved to https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/P44752 and previous config saved to /var/cache/conftool/dbconfig/20230223-173127-cdanis.json)
  • 17:32 - <cdanis> if it doesn't improve shortly I'll depool it entirely
  • 17:33 - <cdanis> […] I think it's mostly under control probably
  • 17:36 - cdanis depools db1127 entirely (<+logmsgbot> !log cdanis@cumin1001 dbctl commit (dc=all): 'so hot right now', diff saved to https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/P44753 and previous config saved to /var/cache/conftool/dbconfig/20230223-173608-cdanis.json)
  • 17:42 - Errors drop to pre-incident rates

Detection

Automated alert via VictorOps:

Critical: PHPFPMTooBusy api_appserver (php7.4-fpm.service eqiad)

https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/RIA1lzDZk/application-servers-red-dashboard?panelId=54&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=now-3h&to=now&var-datasource=eqiad%20prometheus/ops&var-cluster=api_appserver The MediaWiki cluster api_appserver in eqiad is experiencing saturation of php7.4-fpm.service workers 9.851% https://bit.ly/wmf-fpmsat Not enough idle php7.4-fpm.service workers for Mediawiki api_appserver at eqiad #page
Alerts Firing:
Labels:
 - alertname = PHPFPMTooBusy
 - cluster = api_appserver
 - prometheus = ops
 - service = php7.4-fpm.service
 - severity = page
 - site = eqiad
 - source = prometheus
 - team = sre
Annotations:
 - dashboard = https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/RIA1lzDZk/application-servers-red-dashboard?panelId=54&fullscreen&orgId=1&from=now-3h&to=now&var-datasource=eqiad%20prometheus/ops&var-cluster=api_appserver
 - description = The MediaWiki cluster api_appserver in eqiad is experiencing saturation of php7.4-fpm.service workers 9.851%
 - runbook = https://bit.ly/wmf-fpmsat
 - summary = Not enough idle php7.4-fpm.service workers for Mediawiki api_appserver at eqiad #page
Source: https://prometheus-eqiad.wikimedia.org/ops/graph?g0.expr=sum+by%28cluster%2C+service%29+%28phpfpm_statustext_processes%7Bcluster%3D~%22%28api_appserver%7Cappserver%7Cparsoid%29%22%2Cstate%3D%22idle%22%7D%29+%2F+sum+by%28cluster%2C+service%29+%28phpfpm_statustext_processes%7Bcluster%3D~%22%28api_appserver%7Cappserver%7Cparsoid%29%22%7D%29+%3C%3D+0.3&g0.tab=1


Graphs

Conclusions

What went well?

  • Detection of the issue
  • Identification of the issue
  • Remedy of the issue before it became a larger problem

What went poorly?

Where did we get lucky?

Links to relevant documentation

Actionables

Scorecard

Incident Engagement ScoreCard
Question Answer

(yes/no)

Notes
People Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents? yes
Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively yes
Were fewer than five people paged? no
Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)? yes
Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers?  Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours. yes
Process Was the "Incident status" section atop the Google Doc kept up-to-date during the incident? yes
Was a public wikimediastatus.net entry created? no
Is there a phabricator task for the incident? yes https://phabricator.wikimedia.org/T330422
Are the documented action items assigned? yes
Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence? yes
Tooling To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are

open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented.

yes
Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling? yes
Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders? yes
Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service? yes
Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook? no
Total score (count of all “yes” answers above) 12