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Incidents/2023-02-11 logstash latency

From Wikitech

document status: draft

Summary

Incident metadata (see Incident Scorecard)
Incident ID 2023-02-11 logstash latency Start 2023-02-11 10:44
Task T331461 End 2023-02-11 12:58
People paged 0 Responder count 0
Coordinators n/a Affected metrics/SLOs Logstash's latency SLO in eqiad was affected.
Impact Logstash messages were delayed for 2h14m. At peak (10:58), up to 45% of messages were delayed.

eqiad's Logstash experienced message congestion that exhausted the latency budget. This incident consumed 160% of the quarterly budget for delayed messages.

Timeline

Write a step by step outline of what happened to cause the incident, and how it was remedied. Include the lead-up to the incident, and any epilogue.

Consider including a graphs of the error rate or other surrogate.

All times in UTC.

  • TODO: Triggering event for the Parsoid errors.
  • 10:41 Beginning of a flood of exceptions logged from Parsoid, with message: [92ed9dea-d7d4-4b36-9398-202a2e4ccb4c] /w/rest.php/www.mediawiki.org/v3/page/pagebundle/Extension%3ATemplateStylesExtender/5769267   PHP Notice: Trying to get property 'nextSibling' of non-object (logstash)
  • 10:44 As events accumulate on the Kafka queue faster than Logstash can consume them, the fraction of events affected by consumer lag (measured by Burrow) rises from its normal value of zero. (dashboard) OUTAGE BEGINS
  • 10:45 Alert fires: (LogstashKafkaConsumerLag) firing: Too many messages in kafka logging (IRC)
  • 10:49 Exception logging hits its peak: 54.6k messages/sec.
  • 10:54 Last exception is logged from Parsoid. In total, 8,643,149 messages were logged. Logstash continues to work through the queue. (logstash)
  • 10:58 Kafka lag hits its peak: 45.8% of messages are lagged. (dashboard)
  • 12:55 Alert resolves: (LogstashKafkaConsumerLag) resolved: Too many messages in kafka logging (IRC)
  • 12:56 The last backlogged Parsoid events are processed, and the fraction of lagged events returns to zero. (dashboard) OUTAGE ENDS

Detection

One IRC-only alert fired:

[10:45:55] <jinxer-wm> (LogstashKafkaConsumerLag) firing: Too many messages in kafka logging - https://wikitech.wikimedia.org/wiki/Logstash#Kafka_consumer_lag - https://grafana.wikimedia.org/d/000000484/kafka-consumer-lag?var-cluster=logging-eqiad&var-datasource=eqiad%20prometheus/ops - https://alerts.wikimedia.org/?q=alertname%3DLogstashKafkaConsumerLag

It was Saturday, and there was no page, so nobody saw or responded to the alert. The problem wasn't noticed until the end of the SLO quarter, when we discovered in the normal reporting process that Logstash had missed its latency SLO in eqiad.

Conclusions

OPTIONAL: General conclusions (bullet points or narrative)

What went well?

OPTIONAL: (Use bullet points) for example: automated monitoring detected the incident, outage was root-caused quickly, etc

What went poorly?

OPTIONAL: (Use bullet points) for example: documentation on the affected service was unhelpful, communication difficulties, etc

Where did we get lucky?

OPTIONAL: (Use bullet points) for example: user's error report was exceptionally detailed, incident occurred when the most people were online to assist, etc

Links to relevant documentation

Add links to information that someone responding to this alert should have (runbook, plus supporting docs). If that documentation does not exist, add an action item to create it.

Actionables

  • TODO: Decide whether to include an action item for a paging alert on Kafka lag/backlog
  • ...

Create a list of action items that will help prevent this from happening again as much as possible. Link to or create a Phabricator task for every step.

Add the #Sustainability (Incident Followup) and the #SRE-OnFIRE (Pending Review & Scorecard) Phabricator tag to these tasks.

Scorecard

Incident Engagement ScoreCard
Question Answer

(yes/no)

Notes
People Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents? yes No one was paged or responded at the time of the incident. These answers are a best effort for that situation, based on the intent of the questions. (E.g., here, "yes" because the incident didn't contribute to burning anyone out.)
Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively no
Were fewer than five people paged? yes
Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)? no
Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers?  Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours. yes
Process Was the "Incident status" section atop the Google Doc kept up-to-date during the incident? no
Was a public wikimediastatus.net entry created? no But one wouldn't have been appropriate, even if we had responded -- Logstash is critical SRE-facing infrastructure but is not user-facing.
Is there a phabricator task for the incident? yes
Are the documented action items assigned? not yet
Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence? yes
Tooling To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are

open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented.

yes
Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling? yes
Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders? no
Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service? ? Blank for now because I'm not sure. Logstash itself would have been a key debugging tool, and mid-incident it would have shown the culprit messages but at a long delay; between 10:54 and 12:55, we wouldn't have known that the flood was over. But maybe other tools would have had that information available.
Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook? no
Total score (count of all “yes” answers above) 7