Incidents/2022-08-10 confd all hosts
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document status: draft
Summary
Incident ID | 2022-08-10 confd all hosts | Start | 2022-08-10 10:32:00 |
---|---|---|---|
Task | T313825 | End | 2022-08-10 13:31:00 |
People paged | 0 | Responder count | 3 |
Coordinators | Jaime | Affected metrics/SLOs | |
Impact | No external impact. |
A Puppet patch (change 817307) was merged which would accidentally install confd on a significant number of production hosts. The Puppet provisioning for these confd installations failed half-way due to having no corresponding Icinga checks defined. This in turn fired an Icinga alert:
10:44 <icinga-wm> PROBLEM - Widespread puppet agent failures on alert1001 is CRITICAL: 0.1057 ge 0.01
Engineers started work on reversing it, by cleaning up the inadvertent installs of confd via Cumin. Security posture was not compromised and there was no external user impact.
Documentation:
- puppet failures - https://logstash.wikimedia.org/goto/a5b60af08e257d90a469a78d12056ec2
- Confd
- Cumin
Actionables
- Git defaults to shows the author's date, not the commit date. Consider adding the following aliases to your git config as fix:
lola = log --graph --pretty=format:\"%C(auto)%h%d%Creset %C(cyan)(%cr)%Creset %C(green)%cn <%ce>%Creset %s\" --all
grephist = log --graph --pretty=format:\"%C(auto)%h%d%Creset %C(cyan)(%cr)%Creset %C(green)%cn <%ce>%Creset %s\" --all -S
Scorecard
Question | Answer
(yes/no) |
Notes | |
---|---|---|---|
People | Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents? | yes | Overlap of 3 |
Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively | yes | ||
Were fewer than five people paged? | yes | ||
Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)? | yes | n/a | |
Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers? Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours. | yes | n/a | |
Process | Was the incident status section actively updated during the incident? | yes | |
Was the public status page updated? | no | ||
Is there a phabricator task for the incident? | no | ||
Are the documented action items assigned? | yes | action items limited to improved local bash aliases | |
Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence? | yes | ||
Tooling | To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are
open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented. |
yes | |
Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling? | yes | ||
Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders? | yes | ||
Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service? | yes | ||
Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook? | no | ||
Total score (count of all “yes” answers above) | 12 |