Incidents/2022-07-03 shellbox request spike
document status: in-review
|Incident ID||2022-07-03 shellbox request spike||Start||2022-07-03 11:17:00|
|People paged||26 (twice)||Responder count||10|
|Impact||For 16 minutes, edits and previews for pages with Score musical notes were too slow or unavailable.|
An increase in Score requests (musical note rendering) from Parsoid overwhelmed the Shellbox service. This was mitigated by allocating more k8s pods to Shellbox. The overload took place from 11:17 to 11:33.
From the Grafana dashboard, we see that a majority of requests took over 5,000ms (5s) instead of less the usual 10ms (0.01s), and for two minutes 11:25-11:27 requests actually failed with HTTP 503 instead.
From the Logstash dashboard, we measure approximately 35,000 failed requests during this time. Of which 99.9% were from Parsoid, for de.wikipedia.org requests that render musical notes through the Score extension. 26K received HTTP 503, and 9K received HTTP 504. The remaining 0.1% were edits or pageviews calling Shellbox for syntax highlighting.
See 2022-07-11 Shellbox and parsoid saturation for re-occurrence and follow up action items.
- T310557: Improving Shellbox resource management
- T312319: Reduce Lilypond shellouts from VisualEditor
|People||Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents?||no|
|Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively||yes|
|Were fewer than five people paged?||no|
|Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)?||no|
|Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers? Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours.||yes|
|Process||Was the incident status section actively updated during the incident?||yes|
|Was the public status page updated?||no|
|Is there a phabricator task for the incident?||yes|
|Are the documented action items assigned?||no|
|Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence?||no|
|Tooling||To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are
open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented.
|Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling?||yes|
|Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders?||yes|
|Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service?||yes|
|Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook?||no|
|Total score (count of all “yes” answers above)||7|