Incidents/2022-06-30 asw-a4-codfw accidental power cycle

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document status: draft

Summary

Incident metadata (see Incident Scorecard)
Incident ID 2022-06-30 asw-a4-codfw accidental power cycle Start 2022-06-30 15:23:00
Task T309957 End 2022-06-30 15:41:00
People paged 0 Responder count 7+
Coordinators - Affected metrics/SLOs
Impact For approximately 18 minutes, servers in the A4-codfw rack lost network connectivity. Little to no external impact as affected services were either inactive in Codfw or had local redundancy.

Network connectivity for the A4 codfw server rack went down due to full power loss of its switch. This caused lots of alert spam, but otherwise it had very little to no impact on users due to services not being pooled on codfw or redundancy working as intended.

This was very similar incident to Incidents/2022-06-21 asw-a2-codfw accidental power cycle (bump wrong cable on switch side again). See that page for more details.

After the secondary power cord was properly connected, connectivity recovered with no known issues. Power maintenance on that rack finished at 15:50.

Scorecard

Incident Engagement ScoreCard
Question Answer

(yes/no)

Notes
People Were the people responding to this incident sufficiently different than the previous five incidents? no
Were the people who responded prepared enough to respond effectively yes
Were fewer than five people paged? yes Not paging
Were pages routed to the correct sub-team(s)? no Not paging
Were pages routed to online (business hours) engineers? Answer “no” if engineers were paged after business hours. yes Not paging
Process Was the incident status section actively updated during the incident? no No working doc
Was the public status page updated? no not user facing
Is there a phabricator task for the incident? yes
Are the documented action items assigned? no
Is this incident sufficiently different from earlier incidents so as not to be a repeat occurrence? no
Tooling To the best of your knowledge was the open task queue free of any tasks that would have prevented this incident? Answer “no” if there are

open tasks that would prevent this incident or make mitigation easier if implemented.

no
Were the people responding able to communicate effectively during the incident with the existing tooling? yes
Did existing monitoring notify the initial responders? yes
Were the engineering tools that were to be used during the incident, available and in service? yes
Were the steps taken to mitigate guided by an existing runbook? no
Total score (count of all “yes” answers above)